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• The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is one of the aspects of the
world trading system on which the views of the industrialized and developing countries are sharply divided. While
the industrialized countries celebrate the Agreement as a breakthrough in the global protection of intellectual
property, the developing countries fear that rising prices of knowledge-intensive products and impeded access to
know-how will delay their technological catching-up process.
• Intellectual property rights are an important means of promoting technological progress because they give in-
ventors monopoly rights in their innovations for a limited period. This has the disadvantage of preventing the so-
cially desirable earliest possible dissemination of knowledge.
• The TRIPS Agreement is leading to the international approximation of legislation on the protection of intellectual
property at a relatively high level and to a significant increase in protection in most developing countries. The
less developed countries will suffer welfare losses; more advanced developing countries may also benefit from
stronger intellectual property rights because of increasing technology transfer and domestic innovation.
• Neither the historical experience of today’s industrialized countries nor economic theory endorse every aspect of
the TRIPS Agreement. In patent law in particular there is room for development-friendly reforms. The flexibility
allowed by the Agreement should be retained and, where appropriate, widened. At all events, the industrialized
countries must refrain from using bilateral pressure to induce developing countries to afford even greater protec-
tion to intellectual property than that required by the TRIPS Agreement.
• The TRIPS Agreement raises major problems in developing countries when little or no advantage is taken of
existing flexibility. Many developing countries need help with the incorporation of the requirements of the Agree-
ment into national legislation with appropriate account taken of their economic and social needs.
• Apart from participating in the debates in the World Trade Organization, industrialized countries should increase
their efforts to make relevant know-how and technology available to developing countries: targeted incentives
may promote the transfer of technology to developing countries; public research in areas of relevance to devel-
oping countries should again be stepped up; public research institutions should be granted special authorization
to use patented products and processes.
Contents of the TRIPS Agreement
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) forms the third pillar of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) alongside the
agreements on goods and services. The rules it contains
cover three aspects in particular: it sets relatively high
standards for the protection of intellectual property in
what are today the most important areas in this respect;
it contains detailed procedural guidelines aimed at
ensuring rights are actually enforced; and it requires
the WTO’s member countries to submit any disputes to
the WTO settlement procedure. All in all, the TRIPS
Agreement thus leads to an international approximation
of legislation on the protection of intellectual property
at a relatively high level and to a significant increase in
protection in most developing countries.
The level of protection afforded to intellectual property
is determined by the rules on the scope of protection,
exemptions and the enforcement of protection. The
scope of the TRIPS Agreement is considerable: with
patents, copyright protection, trade marks, geograph-
ical indications, industrial designs, layout-designs of
integrated circuits and undisclosed information, it
covers the most important spheres of intellectual prop-
erty. The protection standards are high and in many
cases guided by the level in the industrialized coun-
tries, although formally they are no more than min-
imum standards. The exemptions from protection are
worded in fairly vague terms and accompanied by
numerous conditions. It becomes more difficult, for
example, to issue compulsory licences, which, in the
event of abuse, may enable an invention to be eco-
nomically exploited against the will of the holder of the
rights. On the other hand, the procedural guidelines and
the dispute settlement mechanism have the effect of
requiring the member countries to ensure that rights are
actually enforced. In general, the Agreement thus
places greater emphasis on the protection of intellectual
property than on the limits to such protection.
The industrialized and developing countries are par-
ticularly at odds over the rules on patent rights. The
Agreement provides for very wide-ranging protection
of patents on products and production processes in all
areas of technology for at least twenty years. However,
limited exemptions from patentability are possible.
They concern (i) the protection of public order, in-
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2cluding health protection, (ii) medical procedures and
(iii) plants and animals, with the exception of microor-
ganisms and plant varieties.
Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, the TRIPS
Agreement calls for the approximation of legislation,
but not for the complete international harmonization of
protection. The protection of intellectual property
rights continues to be territorially based, and countries
retain a degree of flexibility in incorporating the
Agreement into national law. This latitude stems from
three factors: first, the Agreement provides for transi-
tional periods for developing countries, continuing
until 2006 in the case of the least developed countries
(LDCs); second, various of its provisions allow explicit
latitude; and third, implicit latitude exists because
certain parts of the Agreement are in need of and open
to interpretation.
Developing countries’ criticisms of the
TRIPS Agreement
Despite this flexibility, the developing countries have
criticized the TRIPS Agreement from the outset for
unduly restricting their domestic economic policies.
They refused to negotiate on the protection of intellec-
tual property rights in the WTO on the grounds that
this had nothing to do with market access or interna-
tional trade. In the economic sphere they were afraid
that the transfer of technology to their countries would
be slowed down: knowledge-intensive goods would
become more expensive, the protection of rights would
primarily benefit multinational corporations, and the
world would become even more technologically di-
vided. In the end, however, they agreed to the TRIPS
Agreement in 1994 because it brought them advantages
in other areas of the WTO (especially with regard to
access to agricultural and textile markets) as part of a
package deal.
The pharmaceutical sector and the
TRIPS Agreement
The pharmaceutical sector is seen as a typical example
of the economic and ethical tensions associated with
the protection of intellectual property rights. There is a
conflict between short- and long-term objectives in this
sector: on the one hand, the introduction of patents on
pharmaceutical products will raise the prices of drugs
in many developing countries – by as much as 90%
according to some estimates. This will be a serious
burden on health care for the poor, hampering the
supply of AIDS drugs, for example. On the other hand,
it is in society’s interest to use incentives of the kind
provided by patent law to encourage the development
of new drugs and vaccines.
From the developing countries’ point of view, there is
an important third aspect to be considered: many coun-
tries, including today’s industrialized nations, have
supported the development of domestic pharmaceutical
industries by making the imitation of drugs possible.
Such countries as India have provided for patents on
pharmaceutical processes (but not on pharmaceutical
products) to allow the local industry to benefit from
learning-by-doing. Many enterprises now about to
become internationally competitive have profited from
this. A strategy of this kind will be precluded by the
TRIPS Agreement in the future.
Today no developing country publicly opposes the
protection of intellectual property rights. Although
most developing countries continue to share the view
that they have been “taken for a ride” by the TRIPS
Agreement, the criticism has become more discrim-
inating. It is directed primarily at provisions of patent
law, and especially at two sensitive sectors: pharma-
ceuticals and biotechnology.
Obligation to patent genes and plant varieties?
Article 27(3)(b) is among the most controversial provi-
sions of the TRIPS Agreement. It specifies which
biotechnological inventions must be patented and
which are exempted from this requirement. Microor-
ganisms and non-biological and microbiological meth-
ods of breeding plants and animals must be patented,
whereas plants and animals and biological breeding
methods need not be. For plant varieties provision must
be made for effective sui generis protection if a country
decides against patenting.
An obligation to patent genetic resources cannot be
deduced from the wording of Article 27. Developing
countries may classify genes as discoveries, which,
unlike inventions, need not be patented. However,
many developing countries point to the problem of
distinguishing the various categories referred to above,
which gives rise to legal uncertainties. Nor has it yet
been clarified when the protection of a plant variety
can be considered “effective” and so accepted by the
WTO as an alternative to a patent.
Another criticism is that little time is allowed for the
implementation of the Agreement in countries with
insufficient previous experience of intellectual property
rights. The TRIPS Agreement poses major challenges
for these countries, since they have to develop a set of
rules that is attuned to their specific needs while com-
plying with the requirements of the Agreement.
The developing countries criticize the industrialized
countries for failing to honour the obligations imposed
on them by the Agreement to promote technology
transfer to developing countries. The Agreement does,
after all, define a number of obligations, although they
have not been operationalized. This makes it relatively
easy for the industrialized countries to shirk their
responsibility. The developing countries see this as an
example of the way in which the TRIPS Agreement is
not only biased towards the industrialized countries in
the benefits it brings but is also being implemented to
the developing countries’ disadvantage.
The developing countries also fear that the latitude still
allowed by the TRIPS Agreement will be limited by
the industrialized countries as time passes. This may be
achieved through renegotiation, restrictive judgments
in dispute settlement procedures or through bilateral
pressure. Initial signs of such pressure are already
discernible, as the USA and EU endeavour to establish
a “TRIPS-plus” regime in bilateral trade agreements
with many developing countries (providing, for ex-
ample, for very strict protection of species and high
barriers to the issue of compulsory licences).
3Assessment of the TRIPS Agreement from an eco-
nomic angle
The TRIPS Agreement should be viewed critically
because certain of its protection standards lead to the
approximation of legislation at a level which is not
economically justified. The flexibility that nation states
enjoy is too severely restricted in some respects, espe-
cially where patent law is concerned. This criticism is
all the more valid if the Agreement is interpreted more
restrictively in the future than was initially expected.
From an economic angle there are sound arguments for
protecting intellectual property rights. Intellectual
property rights enable researchers and enterprises to
recoup their risky investments in research and devel-
opment through the exclusive right to market the new
product. This “reward” for the inventor does not have a
primarily moral justification, but is intended to speed
up technological progress and so eventually to benefit
the economic prosperity of society as a whole. Intel-
lectual property rights help to improve an economy’s
dynamic efficiency.
This instrument has its price, however: static efficiency
is reduced because the rapid dissemination of existing
know-how is impeded. Intellectual property rights must
permit a compromise between the two legitimate
objectives to be negotiated in the democratic process.
In the industrialized countries it was found that the
arguments for increasingly strict protection became
stronger in the course of economic development. In
other words, economically weaker countries did less to
protect intellectual property until they had sufficient
innovation potential and their business community’s
self-interest in the enforcement of intellectual property
rights therefore increased.
Software protection
Software is a knowledge-intensive product that is easy
to copy and duplicate. Software developers therefore
need protection for their intellectual property. The
TRIPS Agreement provides copyright protection for
software (Article 10), as is common practice in the
industrialized countries. However, the Agreement also
prescribes patent protection for inventions in all fields
of technology (Article 27). This gives rise to legal
uncertainty with major implications.
For the tendency in the industrialized countries, and
especially the USA, is to grant patent protection for
software. In the future developing countries may come
under pressure to follow the same course. As patents
also extend to the idea behind the product, the protec-
tion is far greater than under copyright law, and follow-
up innovations may be impeded. The competitive
position of young software enterprises would also be
weakened, since newly developed products usually
include (patented) elements of older products. This
would raise production costs for subsequent inventors
owing to licence fees and transaction costs in general.
Besides historical experience, the recent economic
theory argues against the global harmonization of
protection standards. Most North-South models come
to the conclusion that any global expansion of protec-
tion will lead to welfare losses in the developing coun-
tries and welfare gains in the industrialized countries.
To qualify this statement, LDCs in particular will
suffer where higher protection standards are applied,
and this for two reasons: first, dynamic incentives at
domestic level have little impact owing to the absence
of a local innovation base, and second, global innova-
tions are not appreciably influenced owing to the small
size of markets. The LDCs will nonetheless have to
pay static costs because of the higher prices of know-
how.
Advanced developing countries, on the other hand,
may benefit even in the medium term, since they have
domestic innovation potential. Furthermore, better
protected intellectual property rights are likely to
facilitate the transfer of state-of-the-art technology
through foreign direct investment or under licensing
agreements.
In the agricultural sector the required protection of
biotechnological products may pose serious problems
if the Agreement is not properly implemented. Exces-
sive protection of new plant varieties would make it
more difficult for farmers to use crops as seed. Ob-
structing access to phytogenetic resources would also
be ecologically and economically questionable, as it
might result in a reduction of biodiversity.
Proposals for the reform of the TRIPS Agreement
Since 1999 numerous proposals for the reform of the
TRIPS Agreement have been put forward by the devel-
oping countries in the WTO. They emerged during the
run-up to the WTO ministerial conference in Seattle
and the “review procedures” built into the Agreement.
The gist of the proposals is that the TRIPS Agreement,
though accepted as a fait accompli, should be made
more “development-friendly”.
The industrialized countries initially refused even to
discuss these proposals, their position being that the
review process extends only to the state of implemen-
tation and not to the contents of the Agreement. In the
meantime, however, the EU has shifted its position
towards that of the infuriated developing countries and
is demonstrating growing flexibility in some respects.
The USA is also beginning to discuss the substance,
although it still shows little sign of any willingness to
compromise. The following proposals from the devel-
oping countries are well founded in terms of economic
theory:
• The latitude currently allowed by Article 27(3)(b)
(see the box headed “Obligation to patent genes
and plant varieties?”) as regards the patenting of
natural resources should be retained and, where
appropriate, widened. To make it more difficult for
certain biotechnology enterprises to acquire gen-
etic resources or traditional know-how without
paying for them (“biopiracy”), the Agreement
should be amended to require that patent applica-
tions include references to the prior informed con-
sent of the source country and to a benefit-sharing
agreement. Both already form part of the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity (CBD), which has
been signed by 177 states. The Secretariat of the
CBD should be granted observer status on the
WTO’s TRIPS Council to ensure coherence be-
tween the two agreements.
• Industrialized countries should honour their obli-
gation under the Agreement to promote the trans-
fer of technology to developing countries by pro-
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viding suitable incentives for research institutions
and private enterprises. Such incentives include
targeted subsidies, premiums and tax concessions.
LDCs in particular are otherwise in danger of be-
coming even more remote from technological pro-
gress.
• Industrialized countries should refrain from inter-
preting the text of the Agreement any more
restrictively than necessary. There should be no
obligation to patent software. The decision
whether parallel imports (imports of a legal licen-
see’s patented products from a third country) are
permitted or prohibited must continue to be at
countries’ discretion. Developing countries must
not be deterred by bilateral pressure from intro-
ducing rules on compulsory licences.
Implications for development policy
As has become clear above, the effects of the TRIPS
Agreement very much depend on how it is imple-
mented by the various countries. Although the Agree-
ment does not comply with the recommendations of
economic theory, it leaves nation states some scope for
alleviating negative effects and providing positive
incentives. Besides calling for the judicious reforms of
the Agreement outlined above, development policy
should therefore focus on the accompanying measures
referred to in the following, which in many respects
have more immediate implications for the people
concerned than the Agreement itself.
Most developing countries need additional measures to
help them to incorporate the TRIPS Agreement into
national law. In many cases the transitional periods will
also have to be extended. Advantage should continue to
be taken of the legal competence of the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO), which, under a
cooperation agreement with the WTO, has assumed the
task of advising the developing countries. However, a
development policy component should be added to
WIPO’s assistance, since it is essential that a country’s
economic and social interests be taken into account
when the TRIPS Agreement is incorporated into its
national law. To this end, there should be close co-
operation between WIPO and UNCTAD (United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development), since
the developing countries accept UNCTAD as the
guardian of their economic interests.
The industrialized countries should play their part in
easing the pressure of the specific problems affecting
the pharmaceutical sector. Public medical research into
diseases that pose particular problems in developing
countries (e.g. AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria) should
be stepped up. Cooperation with private pharmaceut-
ical companies, possibly backed by guarantees to
purchase newly developed, patented drugs, may also be
a worthwhile approach. The tough stance taken by the
industrialized countries in defending drug patents is
ethically and economically acceptable only if comple-
mented by such measures.
Public research funds must also be increased in other
sectors. Public research remains, after all, the most
important area of state action to develop additional
know-how for developing countries. The negative view
taken of the TRIPS Agreement by large sections of
civil society also stems from the fact that the strength-
ening of private intellectual property rights is accom-
panied by a reduction of public funds for development-
oriented research. Consequently, the incentives to
create new know-how are guided by private profit
interests.
Although in principle this cannot be criticized in a
market economy, it has to be said that research is being
neglected in areas in which pronounced social need
coincides with low private purchasing power – the very
situation in which the poor in developing countries find
themselves. From the economic angle there is a need
for action because of the existence of external effects,
i.e. the social rates of return are far higher than the
private rates. Public health, food security and environ-
mental sustainability are of immediate benefit not only
to those directly concerned but ultimately to the world
as a whole. As with multilateral environmental agree-
ments, there is therefore a joint, but differentiated
responsibility to create know-how in these areas.
Public research should also be backed by measures to
ensure that intellectual property rights do not impede
the work of public research institutes. International
agricultural and pharmaceutical research institutes
operating on a non-profit basis should be granted
exemptions to enable them freely to use important
patented processes or basic materials, so that the devel-
opment of products for developing countries is not
hampered.
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